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STATEMENT QF THE KIND QF CASE 
Plaintiff brought this action for a declaratory 
judgment to determine whether it was required to file information 
required by the Treasurer under the Utah Unclaimed Property Act 
and to pay over amounts claimed by the Treasurer for uncashed 
money orders issued by Plaintiff. 
PISPQSITIQN IN TEE LQWEfi COURT 
Summary Judgment was entered by the District Court in 
favor of Plaintiff and against the Defendant on cross motions for 
summary judgmentf defendants appeal, 
fiELISF SOUGHT QN APPEAl* 
Defendants seek reversal of the judgment and judgment 
in favor of Defendants as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff issues money orders throughout the United 
States. Some money orders issued in Utah are never cashed. The 
Treasurer of the State of Utah claimed that under the Utah 
1 
Unclaimed Property Act plaintiff had a duty to file reports 
concerning these funds and to pay funds over to the Treasurer. 
Plaintiff filed reports and paid funds to the Treasurer under an 
agreement which preserved plaintiff's right to file an action to 
1. Section 78-44-1, et seq. U.C.A. 1953 
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determine whether it had a duty to file reports and to pay these 
funds to the Treasurer. Plaintiff claimed that under the six 
2 
year statute of limitations , the rights of the payee-owner are 
extinguished and consequently there is no "sum payable" seven 
years after the money order was issued which could be "presumed 
abandoned" after seven years at which time plaintiff would have 
3 
to file its report with the Treasurer* 
The parties stipulated that the sole question involved 
is whether the six year limitation precludes the Treasurer from 
requiring reports and transfer of funds under the Utah Act. 
£ ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE UTAH DISPOSITION OF UNCLAIMED PROPERTY 
ACT WAS INTENDED TO PREVENT LOSS TO THE OWNER 
OF PROPERTY IN THE CUSTODY OF OTHERS BY 
PUBLIC OR CORPORATE ESCHEAT. 
Prior to the enactment of the Utah Unclaimed Property 
Act, unclaimed property escheated to the State. One of the 
purposes the Legislature had in mind in adopting the Act was to 
prevent forefeiture of the owner's property. In general this 
purpose is accomplished by requiring the person in possession of 
such property to transfer possession to the Treasurer who has a 
duty to try to locate the owner. The owner's right to recover 
2. Section 78-12-23 U.C.A. 1953 
3. Section 78-44-2, U.C.A. 1953 
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his property from the Treasurer is not time limited and an 
escheat does not occur. The Treasurer contends that the Utah Act 
removes limitations periods which might otherwise have been 
applicable between the owner and the person in possession of the 
property in cases covered by the statute. 
The Act was intended to prevent forfeiture by private 
escheat or unjust enrichment of a person or entity in possession 
which has no equitable claim to funds or property in its 
possession merely because the owner had failed to demand payment 
within the six year period. 
The Treasurer contends that Plaintiff and other 
entities which issue money orders or similar instruments have no 
equitable claim to funds which remain in possession when a money 
order is not presented for payment. At the time the money order 
is issued, the owner pays all of the money (and perhaps a fee as 
well) to the issuer which it will be required to pay at some 
future date. The issuer receives income from investment of funds 
received for money orders until the money order is presented for 
payment. 
Section 78-48-8 in the Act as it was passed in 1957 
covered "... all intangible property..." not otherwise covered in 
the Act. In 1959 the legislature specifically included the term 
"money order." 
-3-
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It is clear that the 1959 amendment evidenced the 
Legislature's intent that the six year limitation not apply. 
The Legislature intended that from the time of 
abandonment until the owner is located that all of the people 
through the Uniform School Fund, not the entity, have the use and 
benefit of this property. It further determined that transfer of 
funds to the Treasurer would relieve the person in possession 
from any liability to the owner. 
POINT II 
THE SIX YEAR LIMITATION PERIOD IS 
INAPPLICABLE 
Some cases have held that a limitation of action period 
V -: • -v. -:r 4 
not only bars the remedy but bars the right as well. The 
5 6 
general rule and later case law hold that statutes of 
•limitation are procedural bars only and the legislature has the 
power to extend the period as to causes of action that have not 
been time barred by the effective date of the limitation period. 
The Treasurer does not claim that the legislature can 
constitutionally revive causes of action that have been time 
7 
barred by then applicable statutes of limitations. 
4. Ireland v. Mackintosh, 61 Pac 901 (Utah) 
5. See Statutes of Limitations 63 Harvard Law 
Review 1177 
6. Del Monte Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 24 (Utah) 
7. Douglas Aircraft Co. v. Cranston, 374 P.2d 
819 (Cal), 98 A.L.R. 2d 298. 
-4-
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The basic question is only whether the Utah Legislature 
intended to effect a change in the rights of the owner and issuer 
either as a change in the law of property or in the limitation 
period applicable. Under the commonly accepted rules of 
statutory construction the Treasurer submits that the intent of 
the Legislature was to change the limitation period for otherwise 
the Act could never become effective. 
Plaintiff may argue that the six year limitation 
permits it to refuse payment to all of its customers who present 
money orders for payment after six years. It would seem that 
this position has not been taken as a matter of actual practice 
by Plaintiff. What is clear is that Plaintiff cannot waive the 
statute for customers and at the same time urge the statute 
8 
against the Treasurer under the Act. 
i 
POINT III 
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION COMPEL THE 
APPLICATION OF THE UTAH DISPOSITION OF 
UNCLAIMED PROPERTY ACT TO THIS CASE. 
There are many rules for construing statutes, and all 
of these rules are merely aids to the court to determine what a 
8. South Carolina. Tax Comm. y. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co.. 221 S.E.2d 522 
-5-
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legislature intended to accomplish when it enacted or amended a 
statute. 
A statute carries with it a presumption that it is 
valid and that words and phrases were chosen advisedly to express 
9 
the legislative intent. The court does not look to correlation 
or arrangment of words alone but may look to reasonf spirit and 
sense of the legislation as indicated by the entire context and 
10 
subject matter of statutes dealing with the subject. The court 
should give an act such a construction as will accomplish its 
11 
purpose, A statute must be construed with reference to the 
12 
objects sought to be accomplished by it. Where there is doubt 
or uncertainty concerning interpretation and applicable of 
statutes, they should be reviewed in light of the conditions and 
necessities which they are intended to meet and objectives sought 
13 
to be obtained thereby. 
When a statute has been enacted for a particular 
purpose and another statute has been enacted at another time for 
9. Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138r 434 P.2d 449. 
10. Masjcfr yt ytS> SmelUng, Rfg, $ Min, Co. i 113 Utah 101f 
191 P.2d 612, app. dism. 335 U.S. 866, reh. den. 335 U.S. 905. 
11. Ralph Child Const. Co, v. State Tax Comm.. 12 Utah 2d 
53, 362 P.2d 422. 
12. Conover v. Bd. of Education of Nebo Sch. Dist., 110 
Utah 4564, 175 P.2d 202, reh. den. k86 P.2d 588. 
13. Continents Tel. CQt V. Stat? Tax Comm.r 539 P.2d 447 
(Utah); Grant v. Utah State Land Board. 26 Utah 2d 100, 485 P.2d 
1035. 
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a different purpose and there is apparent conflict, the statutes 
should be looked at together with a view to reconciling apparent 
conflict and giving each statute its intended effect insofar as 
14 
possible without nullifying the other. 
A preference should be given to latter statutes over 
15 
prior ones where there is a conflict. The latter statute is 
16 
controlling. 
The legislature does not intend to do a vain and 
17 
useless act. 
The Treasurer submits that the Disposition of Unclaimed 
Property Act was intended to be a remedial act. The intention 
was to require the holder of the abandoned property to report to 
the Treasurer such property and to pay it over to the Treasurer 
in accordance with the terms of the Act. It would be a vain and 
useless act to require a holder of property to report on and pay 
over such property to the Treasurer at any time after the six 
year statute had run if it intended to terminate the right or the 
right of action of the owner and vest the right or prevent anyone 
14. In re Utfrfr S9ViP9g fr h9W ASP'n., 21 Utah 2d 169f 442 
P.2d 929; Chaturn v. Terr), 107 Utah 2d 340, 153 P.2d 941; Smith 
v. Am. Packing. 102 Utah 351f 130 P.2d 951. 
15. Batemfln y, BQflCd
 Qf Bx»mj.HQESy 7 Utah 2d 221f 322 P.2d 
381. 
16. Pacific Intermountain Express v. State Tax Comm., 7 Utah 
2d 15f 316 P.2d 549. 
17. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel, Co, v. Dept. of Revenue. 481 
P.2d 556 (Wash.). 
-7-
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from exercising a claim or right on behalf of the owner against 
the holder. 
The six year statute has been Utah law as to written 
contracts since at least 1900. The Act became law in 1957. The 
only reasonable construction which will give both statutes effect 
without nullifying the Act is to construe the six year statute to 
remain effective except as it is modified by the Act. Giving 
this construction allows both statutes to have maximum effect. 
As applied to property subject to the Actr the limitation is 
extended as to all depositsf bank accounts, life insurance 
proceeds and money orders and other property subject to the Act. 
If the construction urged by plaintiff were to be adoptedf the 
property would never be turned over to the State Treasurer, a 
result obviously not intended by the Act. 
Defendants are aware that there are decisions contrary 
to their position. For exampler Washington has construed its act 
18 
to allow the construction sought by the plaintiff. Howeverf 
its Supreme Court in a 4-3 decision held that since the 
Washington Act eventually provided for escheatf the right of the 
Department was derivative from the ownerf and since the owner was 
cut off, the state was likewise cut off. The Department by 
regulation could not set aside the limitation applying to the 
18. Pacific Northwest Bell Tel, Co. v. Deot. of Revenue, 
supra, 
-8-
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wner and the legislature which did not enact Section 16 of the 
Uniform Act nor later amend the Act to include Section 16 as 
urged by the Department did not intend otherwise. The majority 
acknowledged that the Uniform Act (like Utah's Act) has 
eliminated escheat. The three dissenting justices, applying some 
of the rules of construction abovef held that Section 16 was not 
needed, and that the legislative intent in adopting the statutory 
plan was clear. The dissenters also thought that escheat, when 
the claimant had died and there was no one else who could make 
claims to the assets, was not significant. 
While the California Act apparently contained Section 
16 of the Uniform Act, the Supreme Court held that the section 
did not operate retroactively to revive cases already barred by 
19 
the statute of limitations. It did hold that claims not 
barred by the effective date of the Act were subject to the 
provisions of the Act. 
On March 11, 1983 (after this case was argued below) 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court decided Treasurer and Receiver 
20 
General v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co, In that 
case John Hancock made essentially the same argument that 
Plaintiff makes in this case. It argued that the six year 
19. ppugJLas Aircraft C9» Ihc. v. Map 
Cranston. 374 P.2d 819. 
20. 446 N.E.2d 1376 
-9-
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statute precluded that need to report property in its possession 
since the property was not "abandoned propertynat the end of the 
ten or fourteen year dormancy period in effect in 1980, The 
Massachusetts court answered this argument as follows: 
The Legislature could not have meant to 
allow statutes of limitations governing the 
various types of property defined as 
abandoned in G.L. c. 200Af §§1-6, to 
determine randomly the scope of the abandoned 
property law. Most typical statues of 
limitations are shorter than the ten or the 
fourteen year dormancy periods in effet under 
the abandoned property and unclaimed funds 
laws. If John Hancock's argument were to 
prevail, no type of abandoned property 
subject to a typical statute of limitations 
could ever be collected by the Treasurer. 
Thus, John Hancock's construction of the 
statute would render the statute difficult, 
if not impossible, to enforce. It also would 
create a situation in which the purposes of 
the abandoned property act, to reunite the 
property with its owners and to employ the 
property for public purposes in the interim, 
could not be achieved. "An intention to 
enact a barren and ineffective provision is 
not lightly to be imputed to the 
Legislature." Insurance Rating Bd. v. 
Commissioner of Ins., 356 Mass. 184, 189, 248 
N.E.2d 500 (1969). Therefore, we read §7(c) 
as applying only to that property for which 
the statute of limitations had expired as of 
the effective date of St. 1950, c. 801. 
Under this interpretation, the purpose of 
§7(c) was to require only prospective 
reporting of abandoned property, in this 
way, no person or entity who had relied on 
the use of the funds after expiration of a 
statute of limitations and before passage of 
St.1950, c. 801, would be disadvantaged. 
This interpretation is further supported by 
the repeal of this version of §7(c) in 1975, 
because that section had become an 
-10- < 
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unnecessary anachronism by then. See St. 
21 
1975f c. 277, §4. 
The Court also held that 
In addition, the concept of a statute of 
limitations is autithetical to the purposes 
of the abandoned property act. If we adopted 
John Hancock's construction of the statute, 
we would permit every entity to make a self-
serving interpretation of the abandoned 
property and unclaimed funds laws, and to 
use that interpretation to its benefit by 
failing to report such property and barring 
any later enforcement action by a statute of 
limitations. We are unwilling to attribute 
to the Legislature an intent to grant 
unfettered discretion to the holders of 
abandoned property to determine what property 
must be reported, and therefore what property 
is owed to the Commonwealth. We affirm the 
judge's ruling that no statute of limiations 
bars the Treasurer's action against John 
22 
Hancock. 
It is respectfully submitted that while the Utah Act is 
based on the Uniform Act, but omitting Section 16, the Court 
- * • 
should construe the Utah Act in a manner that will give the 
effect to the legislation that was intended by the Legislature. 
The Treasurer submit that the view of the Massachusetts Court is 
a for more reasonable interpretation than is that of the 
Washington Court (4-3 decision). 
21. 446 N.E.2d 1376, 1380-1381 
22. 446 N.E.2d 1376, 1381-1382 
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This court held In the Matter of the Estate of Louis A. 
23 
Grosser that a will witnessed by a 16 year old boy in 1974 was 
valid. The Uniform Probate Code, adopted thereafterf in Section 
75-2-505(1) required a witness to be 18. Section 75-8-101(2)(a) 
provides that the Utah Uniform Probate Code takes effect on 
July lr 1977, and applied to all wills of decedents dying 
thereafter. Grosser died on April 17f 1981. Section 75-2-506 
provides that a will is valid if at the time of making the 
execution complies with the law of the place where the will is 
executed. This language was held to be broad enough to include 
24 
wills executed in Utah. In the Matter of the Estate of Buffi, 
the Idaho Supreme Court construed I.C. Section 15-2-506 
(identical to Section 75-2-506) as a section only to cover wills 
iiiade in other jurisdictionsf and not to be used to validate Idaho 
wills. Justice Howe, speaking for a unanimious court saidf "... 
We will not lightly ascribe an interpretation which will produce 
such an ^ incongruous result. Furthermore, we are hesitant to 
assume that the Legislature, in adopting the Uniform Probate 
Code, intended to invalidate wills which had been properly made 
under prior law in this state." 
Acts based on Uniform Acts, like any other acts of the 
Legislature should be construed to make sense. 
23. No. 18075, January 14, 1983 
24. 98 Idaho 354, 564 P.2d 150 (1977) 
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SUMMARY M P CONCLUSION 
The Treasurer prays the Court to reverse the decision 
of the District Court and to declare as a matter of law that the 
Utah Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act applied to all 
property described in the statutes in the possession of the 
plaintiff on the effective date of the Act and for six years 
prior thereto. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
JOSEPH P. MC CARTHY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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